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From International Law to Jessup’s Transnational Law, 
From Transnational Law to Transnational Legal Orders 
 






In his path breaking 1956 Storrs Lectures, Judge Philip Jessup shifted attention from 
international law, as governing relations between states, to transnational law, as governing 
transnational activities. He famously defined transnational law as “all law which regulates actions 
or events that transcend national frontiers,” which includes public international law, private 
international law, and “other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.”2 Much 
recent scholarship on transnational law has focused on that residual category of “other rules” and 
their “private” character.3 There has, however, been a parallel revolution in public international 
law since Jessup’s lectures, which needs to be theorized in transnational terms. It is best done 
through shifting attention from the concept of transnational law to the concepts of transnational 
legal ordering and transnational legal orders.  
Jessup wrote of the concept of transnational law as problem solving during the Cold War 
when hope in public international law and public international institutions had withered. Jessup 
had served on the United States delegation to both the 1943 Bretton Woods conference that led to 
the creation of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and the 1945 San Francisco 
charter conference that created the United Nations. By 1956, however, the prospect of international 
institutions and international law as problem-solvers had collapsed. Jessup himself had been 
investigated and attacked as a communist sympathizer by U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy, 
undermining Jessup’s reputation and explaining the Senate’s refusal to approve him as the U.S. 
representative to the United Nations. 4  Jessup turned to analyze other means of fostering 
international problem solving through the concept of transnational law that incorporated, but went 
beyond public international law. Jessup’s lectures focused primarily on private international law. 
As reflected in his three lectures’ titles (“The Universality of Human Problems,” “The Power to 
Deal with the Problems,” and “The Choice of Law Governing the Problems”), Jessup was drawn 
to private international law’s functional ability to resolve individual transnational “problems” 
(lecture 1) through its decentralized system of allocating jurisdictional “power” among national 
courts (lecture 2), which, in turn, use “choice of law” techniques to decide on the applicable law 
(lecture 3).  
                                                                    
1 Gregory Shaffer is Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law; Carlos Coye is a 
labor attorney at the law firm Rothner, Segall & Greenstone and a graduate of the University of California, Irvine 
School of Law. 
2 PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Yale University Press, 1956). 
3 Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, 12 ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 231 
(2016). 
4  Oscar Schachter, Philip Jessup’s Life and Ideas, 80:4 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 879, 885-889 
(1986).  
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This article has two main targets for its audience: first, it responds to theorists who conceive 
of transnational law either exclusively or predominately as a private lawmaking phenomenon, and 
second, it addresses the relation of public international law to the concepts of transnational legal 
ordering and transnational legal orders. The article’s thesis is two-fold. First, the scope of public 
international law has exploded since Jessup’s time, arguably more than the other two prongs of his 
conceptualization.5 Second, we should shift our conceptual analysis from transnational law as a 
body of law addressing transnational problems, to transnational legal ordering and transnational 
legal orders, so as to capture these processes’ deeper political, social, and legal implications. The 
term transnational legal ordering refers to the transnational construction, flow, settlement, and 
unsettlement of legal norms in particular domains.6 By transnational legal orders, we mean “a 
collection of formalized legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively 
order the understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions” in these domains.7 These 
developments in public international law and their implications have catalyzed a populist backlash, 
which could, at least in the near term, lead to a renewed turn toward the other two prongs of 
Jessup’s concept, private international law and private rulemaking (Part E). 
This article shows how public international law has become a much more central 
component of transnational law and transnational legal ordering since Jessup wrote, and now 
increasingly permeates state boundaries. Formally, international law does so when it has direct 
effect in national legal systems, when it is enacted by state legislatures in statutes or adopted by 
state regulators as administrative regulations, and when it shapes national courts’ interpretation of 
national law.8 Informally, public international law also has significant effects through iterative 
processes engaging international organizations, soft law norms, indicators, information-sharing, 
expert consultation, peer review, and other technologies of governance that facilitate social 
interaction and produce and diffuse knowledge, norms, and practices that transnationally shape 
law and legal ordering. Private actors are central in driving the development and application of 
international law, as when they participate in norm-making that is eventually incorporated into 
international law, when they bring claims before national courts derived from international law, 
and through their practices that apply and interpret these norms.  
The result is much deeper implications of international law than ad hoc problem solving 
applied to transnational situations as theorized by Jessup. International law deeply implicates what 
the state does (in relation to the market and social ordering), states’ institutional architecture (by 
affecting the allocation of authority among executives, legislatures, courts, administrative bodies, 
                                                                    
5 To recall, the three prongs are public international law, private international law, and other rules. 
6 Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change, in: Gregory Shaffer (ed.), TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1, 5-9. 
7 Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in: Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer 
(eds.), TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 3, 5 (elaborating the concept); Terence 
C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, in: Halliday & Shaffer, TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS, 475.  
8 Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Mila Versteeg, International Law in National Legal Systems: An Empirical Investigation, 
109 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 514 (2015); Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Mila Versteeg, Modes of 
Domestic Incorporation of International Law, in: Wayne Sandholtz & Christopher A. Whytock (eds.)  RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017), 149 (comparing national 
judicial systems regarding “how treaties and custom are received and interpreted, and their status vis-à-vis other 
sources of domestic law”). For highly cited cases regarding the doctrine of avoiding non-compliance with international 
law through statutory construction, see Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (in the U.S. legal 
system); Case C-61/94 Commission v. Germany 1996 E.C.R. I-3989, ¶ 52 (in the E.U. legal system).  
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and central and federal institutions), the role of professions and private parties in governance 
(creating new professional stakes), mechanisms of accountability (including to international 
bodies and transnational networks of public officials and private stakeholders), and social 
identities.9  
This article follows Jessup in asserting that real-world problems should be the starting point 
for analysis. However, it problematizes the conceptualization of problems as involving human 
agency, so that the problems themselves should be viewed as social and political constructs that, 
in turn, shape legal responses. With Jessup, we also contend that public international law is a part 
of the study of transnational law. Yet we build from his analysis by focusing on international law’s 
permeation of national legal systems and local practices so that international law is not viewed on 
a separate plain, as conventionally viewed in the international relations/international law 
scholarship, but rather as part of a recursive transnational legal process.10 While a major prong of 
transnational legal theorizing rightly focuses on private law and private lawmaking (which are 
important and critical areas of study), public law components of transnational law also remain 
central and critically important.11 
 
 
B. THE CONCEPTUAL TURN FROM TRANSNATIONAL LAW TO TRANSNATIONAL  
  LEGAL ORDERS: TWO EXAMPLES 
 
Once we turn from assessing transnational law as law applied to transnational problems to 
assessing processes of transnational legal ordering and the development of transnational legal 
orders, we cannot start with a stipulated problem, but must ask how that problem was framed. 
Problems are not natural since issues can exist for long periods before they are conceptualized as 
problems, much less as “transnational problems.” That conceptualization reflects shifting 
ideologies and interests over time.12 Law responds to such conceptualizations, and thus the very 
definition of a problem shapes the ensuing legal response to it. This section illustrates our thesis 
with two examples, one involving powerful actors and the other marginalized groups, and both 
engaging a combination of bottom-up, top-down, and recursive processes. The first involves 
intellectual property law norms advanced by powerful countries and private actors. The second 
involves indigenous rights norms advanced by marginalized groups, including against powerful 
states and commercial interests. 
 
I. Intellectual Property as a Transnational Legal Order 
Take first the example of intellectual property, which for a long time was a relatively sleepy, self-
contained regime, including at the time Jessup wrote. Under the 1889 Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, countries were given great discretion regarding the content of 
                                                                    
9 Gregory Shaffer (ed.), TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE (Cambridge University Press, 2012); 
Gregory Shaffer, How the World Trade Organization Shapes Regulatory Governance, 9:1 REGULATION AND 
GOVERNANCE 1 (2015); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75:1 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 181 (1996). 
10 Halliday & Shaffer, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 5, 18-21, 37-42; Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 183-86.  
11 Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, 231 (providing a critical literature review of different modes of 
theorizing the transnational). 
12 Halliday & Shaffer, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 7-11. For an example, see Gregory Shaffer, Nathaniel H. 
Nesbitt & Spencer W. Waller, Criminalizing Cartels: A Global Trend?, in: John Duns, Arlen Duke & Brendan 
Sweeney (eds.), COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 301-344  (noting the shift in the 
conceptualization of cartels as evil).  
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patent law as long as they applied it on a non-discriminatory basis.13 In the 1980s, however, a 
group of private entrepreneurs in the United States formed a national association and then a 
transnational network of private stakeholders to enroll the United States to press other countries to 
link intellectual property law to trade agreements.14 The movement successfully prompted the U.S. 
government to amend its national trade regulation (Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act) to authorize 
U.S. unilateral sanctions against countries that did not protect U.S. intellectual property rights. The 
United States then used this leverage to press countries to agree to common public international 
trade law rules to protect intellectual property, such as patents, in return for the United States not 
acting unilaterally as prosecutor, judge, and executioner of trade law. The movement successfully 
gave rise to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Encountering resistance at the level 
of implementation in many countries, the United States continues to press for new requirements 
and review mechanisms through bilateral and plurilateral agreements and mechanisms. 
The TRIPS Agreement is transnational law, in Jessup’s definition, in that it resolves a 
transnational problem—that of a conflict between U.S. industrial and commercial interests and 
developing countries regarding the recognition of intellectual property and the payment of 
royalties. Yet, the TRIPS Agreement is also transnational in a deeper sense as reflected in the 
socio-legal concepts of “transnational legal ordering” and “transnational legal orders.” These 
concepts help unpack how the problem was framed (as a private property right implicating trade), 
by whom (by U.S. and European private parties and their governments), and where the legal 
response derived (from norms developed in U.S. and European law). And it shows the immense 
transnational implications of the change in international law—including the creation of new 
institutions to monitor enforcement at the multilateral level, giving rise to new transnational 
accountability mechanisms under a particular normative frame; the creation of new institutions 
within states to ensure compliance with TRIPS obligations (such as patent examining agencies and 
administrative bodies and courts to hear and enforce patent claims); and the rise and empowerment 
of new professions of patent examiners and intellectual property lawyers who have a professional 
stake in the application of these legal norms. These developments, moreover, are dynamic, 
involving interactions with domestic institutions, professions, commercial interests, and social 
movements over time. 
To give one example of domestic transformations, China did not recognize the concept of 
intellectual property until recent decades, yet today it has created and expanded intellectual 
property institutions, trained judges and administrators in these issues, and intellectual property is 
now an important part of curricula in its law schools.  Between 1997 and 2011, patent filings in 
China increased 3,245 percent. China increased the number of patent examiners in its State 
Intellectual Property Office, rising from 2,700 patent examiners in 2007 to 6,000 in 2011.15 By 
                                                                    
13  Laurence Helfer, Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to Health: The Contested Evolution of the 
Transnational Legal Order on Access to Medicines, in: Halliday & Shaffer, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 311; 
Gregory Shaffer & Susan K. Sell, Transnational Legal Ordering and Access to Medicines, in: Ruth L. Okediji & 
Margo A. Bagley (eds.), PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Oxford University Press, 2014), 97-126. 
14 JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 203-
204. 
15 Shaffer, How the World Trade Organization Shapes Regulatory Governance, 1. Regarding similar processes in 
India, see Gregory Shaffer, James Nedumpara & Aseema Sinha, State Transformation and the Role of Lawyers: The 
WTO, India, and Transnational Legal Ordering, 49:3 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 595 (2015). 
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2016, the numbers increased to over 9,000 patent inspectors in China,16 who received 6,058,575 
applications for recognition of Chinese patents (based on inventions), and who granted 1,464,115 
patents.17  China is now the largest issuer of patents in the world, surpassing the United States.18 
In 2017, it ranked second in terms of international patent applications and third in terms of 
international trademark registrations.19  
At the judicial level, China created specialized intellectual property divisions within courts 
and, in 2014, specialist intellectual property courts in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.20 These 
courts have directly applied the TRIPS Agreement in dozens of private disputes.21 In 2015 alone, 
these specialist courts concluded 9,872 cases.22 In 2018, China decided to establish a specialized 
intellectual property court of appeal at the national level in order to foster uniform jurisprudence 
in intellectual property law.23 Housed in the Supreme People’s Court and headed by its Vice-
President, the new court will hear all appeals against patent-related decisions from lower courts 
from January 1 2019.24 In three years, it is expected that appeals on other intellectual property 
cases, such as copyright and trade secrets, also will be made to the new court.25  Paradoxically, 
China “has emerged as the world’s most litigious country in the intellectual property area,” with 
16,010 new patent cases, 37,946 new trademark cases, and 137,267 new copyright cases reportedly 
filed in 2017.26 These developments are remarkable and involve much more than “transnational 
problem solving.” 
These developments in China are not simply foreign “transplants.” From a top-down 
vantage, the government created its own domestic “indigenous innovation” policies to the 
consternation of the United States and Europe. 27  From a bottom-up perspective, Chinese 
                                                                    
16中华人民共和国国家知识产权局 (STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF THE P.R.C.), 年度报告 (ANNUAL 
REPORT) (2016), 43, available at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/gk/ndbg/2016/201705/P020170505541250020396.pdf. 
17 STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF THE P.R.C., ANNUAL REPORT, Distribution of Inventions (Table 1) and 
Distribution of Grants (Table 4) (2016), available at http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2016/12/. 
18 World Intellectual Property Organization, Who Filed the Most PCT Patent Applications in 2017? 
19 Who Filed the Most Madrid Trademark Applications in 2017?, WORLD INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_madrid_2017.pdf; Who Filed the Most PCT 
Patent Applications in 2017?, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, 
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_pct_2017.pdf.  
20  Kristie Thomas, ASSESSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMPLIANCE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2017), 143 (on specialized courts).  
21 Congyan Cai, International Law in Chinese Courts During the Rise of China, 110:2 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 269, 286-287 (2016).  
22 Thomas, ASSESSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMPLIANCE, 144.  
23 People’s Court News Media Corporation, The Supreme People’s Court Issued the ‘Regulations on Certain Issues 
of the Intellectual Property Tribunal, SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, Dec. 28, 2018, http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-
xiangqing-137461.html.  
24 The Beijing News, The Supreme Law Intellectual Property Court Unveiled the Relevant Cases in Accordance with 
the Law, TENCENT, Jan. 1, 2019, https://new.qq.com/omn/20190101/20190101A0FHFB.html.  
25 Guo Liqin, SPC establishes IP Court, Paving the Road for a Uniform National Appeal Court, YICAI, Oct. 23, 2018, 
https://www.yicai.com/news/100045081.html.  
26 Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, The Status of Judicial Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights in Chinese Courts 2 (2017-2018),  
https://chinaipr2.files.wordpress.com/2018/06/2017e799bde79aaee4b9a6-2018041.docx; Peter Yu, Building 
Intellectual Property Infrastructure Along China’s Belt and Road, 14 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW 
REVIEW 8 (Forthcoming 2019).  
27 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and 
Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act 
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individuals invested in new professional careers focused on intellectual property and Chinese 
companies hired and worked with them. In parallel, domestic constituencies that embraced 
intellectual property protection and became rights holders engaged in information campaigns and 
enforcement actions.28 They worked to shape public awareness and attitudes towards intellectual 
property, including among new generations of Chinese. In addition, as the Chinese became 
wealthier, consumers became more interested in consumer protection, such as against trademark 
fraud.  
In other words, new public international law supported the dynamic development of a 
transnational legal order for the governance of intellectual property that shaped state institutions 
and professions which, in turn, interacted with new constituent demands.29 Once one turns from 
the concept of transnational law (and the more formalist connotation that concept conveys) to those 
of transnational legal ordering and transnational legal order, one shifts one’s focus to the deeper 
processes through which legal norms are constructed, framed, propagated, resisted, adapted, 
settled, and unsettled. 
 
II. Indigenous Rights as an Emerging Transnational Legal Order 
The indigenous rights movement provides an example of how traditionally marginalized 
groups within states also have been able to harness public international law to develop and 
transform legal norms and accountability mechanisms within states. We illustrate these processes 
in a small developing country in Central America (Belize) and a highly industrialized country in 
East Asia (Japan). In these cases, indigenous groups (the Maya and Ainu respectively) have been 
able to use evolving public international law to advance their aims through transnational processes. 
 
1. The Maya in Belize. In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP).30 UNDRIP, in combination with 
regional instruments and regional and international organizations, played a major role in catalyzing 
the Belizean state’s recognition of the communal property rights of the Maya of Southern Belize. 
The Maya of Southern Belize, namely the Ke’kchi and Mopan Maya, have been practicing 
traditional land use and occupation since pre-colonial times, giving rise to claims of customary 
land rights. The Belizean government, however, refused to recognize these claims, and began 
granting logging concessions and oil exploration licenses in the mid-1990s.31  
In the 2000s, the Maya found allies for the recognition of their land rights in regional 
institutions and Belizean courts by making claims under international law. Because of the initial 
judicial inertia in Belize, and with the hope that an international body’s finding in their favor would 
jumpstart domestic courts handling their claims, leaders of the Maya rights movement petitioned 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
                                                                    
of 1974, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Mar. 22, 2018, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF [USTR Section 301 Report], 16. 
28 Thomas, ASSESSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMPLIANCE, 139. 
29 Helfer, Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to Health, 322-324; Shaffer & Sell, Transnational Legal 
Ordering and Access to Medicines, 103-115.  
30 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 
13, 2007), 46 I.L.M. 1013 (2007). 
31 Aurelio Cal et al. v. Attorney General of Belize, Claims Nos. 171 and 172 (Supreme Court of Belize, Judgment of 
18 October 2007), ¶ 18, available at http://www.belizejudiciary.org/web/supreme_court/judgements/2007 
/Claims%20Nos.%20171%20and%20172%20of%202007%20%28Consolidated%29%20re%20Maya%20land%20ri
ghts.pdf.  
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in August 1998.32 They requested that the Commission find that Belize was violating the human 
rights of the Maya under the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and to 
make recommendations to resolve and prevent any future violations. 33  The Inter-American 
Commission investigated and issued a merits report, delivered in October 2004, finding that the 
government of Belize had violated the Maya’s communal property rights under Article XXIII of 
the American Declaration. It maintained, “the right of property has an autonomous meaning in 
international human rights law,” which include “indigenous communal property . . . grounded in 
indigenous custom and tradition. 34 It also found that the Mopan and Ke’kechi Maya people 
demonstrated communal property rights to the lands they inhabit in the Toledo district, and 
Belize’s government violated these rights by failing to demarcate the Maya’s lands and by granting, 
without first consulting the Maya, logging and oil concessions that could lie within these lands.35 
The report cited case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, opinions of the UN 
Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and 
the Inter-American Commission, and provisions of international human rights law. 
Unsatisfied with the government’s response, the Maya continued litigation before the 
Belize Supreme Court. In 2007, Chief Justice Conteh of the Supreme Court recognized that the 
Commission report was not binding, but found it “persuasive” for his determinations, 36  and 
“fortified” his conclusions.37 In his decision, the Chief Justice dedicated an entire section to the 
Belizean government’s obligations under international law, which the government had violated. 
He observed that Belize is a party to, and bound by, a series of international treaties that require 
the recognition and respect for indigenous peoples’ property rights, including the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the Charter of the OAS.38 He cited determinations of UN 
human rights bodies on these issues, including the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, which found that non-recognition of indigenous people’s rights violates 
CERD’s prohibition against discrimination.39 He noted “that both customary international law and 
                                                                    
32 Christina Coc, Director and Co-Founder of the Julian Cho Society, Address at Native American Law Students 
Association at University of California, Irvine School of Law Symposium: Blood Quantum, Sovereignty, and Identity: 
Contemporary Legal Battles in Indigenous Communities (Mar. 24, 2017). 
33 Maya Indigenous Communities and Their Members v. Belize, Case 12.053, Admissibility Report No. 78/100, ¶ 6 
(2000), available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/ChapterIII/Admissible/Belize12.053.htm. 
34 Maya Indigenous Communities and Their Members v. Belize, Case 12.053, Merits Report No. 40/04, ¶ 117 (2004), 
available at http://cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/Belize.12053eng.htm. 
35 Id. at ¶¶ 127, 153. The Commission also found violations of Article II of the American Declaration regarding equal 
protection of the law, and Article XXVIII regarding failure to provide judicial protection on account of undue delay. 
Id. at ¶¶ 171, 186, 192-196. 
36 Aurelio Cal et al. v. Attorney General of Belize, Claims Nos. 171 and 172 (Supreme Court of Belize, Judgment of 
18 October 2007), ¶ 22, available at, http://www.belizejudiciary.org/web/supreme_court/judgements/2007. 
/Claims%20Nos.%20171%20and%20172%20of%202007%20%28Consolidated%29%20re%20Maya%20land%20ri
ghts.pdf. 
37 Id. at ¶ 100.  
38 Id. at ¶¶ 118-134. He wrote: “I conclude therefore, that the defendants are bound, in both domestic law in virtue of 
the Constitutional provisions that have been canvassed in this case, and international law, arising from Belize’s 
obligation thereunder, to respect the rights to and interests of the claimants as members of the indigenous Maya 
community, to their lands and resources which are the subject of this case.” Id. at ¶ 134. 
39 Id. at ¶ 123 (referencing General Recommendation XXIII: Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/52/18 
annex V (Aug. 18, 1997); Id. at ¶ 126 (“These considerations, engaging as they do Belize’s international obligation 
towards indigenous peoples, therefore weighed heavily with me in this case in interpreting the fundamental human 
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general principles of international law would require that Belize respect the rights of its indigenous 
people to their lands and resources,” including as reflected in the 2007 UN General Assembly 
Declaration 61/295 on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). 40  He recognized that 
UNDRIP, as a General Assembly resolution, was non-binding, but concluded that, as it is contains 
general international law principles and was adopted by over 143 states at the time, including 
Belize, it had special “resonance and relevance in the context of [the] case,”41 and the Government 
of Belize could not disregard it.42  
The Maya continued to press their legal claims before the Belize courts and the Caribbean 
Court of Justice (CCJ),43 the final court of appeal in Belize, referencing international law. In 2014, 
in a claim challenging the Belize government’s granting of a permit for road construction and oil 
drilling in a national park, the Belize Supreme Court enjoined the government from proceeding 
until it consulted and obtained the prior consent of the Maya in relation to their property claims. It 
held that “it is incumbent on the Government of Belize to put in place the legal mechanisms 
necessary to recognize and to give effect to those rights belonging to the Maya which have already 
been recognized by . . . the International Commission of Human Rights” under the American 
Declaration.44 It further held that “Belize, as a member state of the United Nations which voted in 
favor of the [UNDRIP] is clearly bound to uphold the general principles of international law 
contained therein” regarding consultation and prior informed consent.45  
In 2015, just before the Caribbean Court of Justice began hearing the final appeal, the 
Belize government entered a settlement in which it committed “to create an effective mechanism 
to identify and protect the property and other rights arising from Maya customary land tenure, in 
accordance with Maya customary laws and land tenure practices.”46 As a representative of the 
Maya people told us, it was the condemnation before international bodies and domestic courts that 
created the pressure on the government to settle before the CCJ decided. In her words “while the 
government looks down on us domestically, when we are in the international front, it is hard for 
them to ignore us. And so we have used the international mechanisms strategically . . . . We are 
using a tool that does not belong to us to prove to the rest of the world that we exist and deserve 
full protection of the laws for our lands.”47  
Because of the settlement agreement, the CCJ only decided whether the government 
violated the Maya’s rights under the Belize Constitution and owed damages. In interpreting the 
                                                                    
rights provisions of the Constitution agitated by the cluster of issues raised, particularly, the rights to property, life, 
security of the person, the protection of the law and the right not to be discriminated against.”).  
40 Id. at ¶ 127. 
41 Id. at ¶ 131. 
42 Id. at ¶ 132 (where the CJ references Article 26 of UNDRIP. According to Article 26, “States shall give legal 
recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due 
respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.”). 
43 The CCJ is Belize’s final court of appeal since 2010 when Belize amended its constitution to abolish appeals to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. 
44 Sarstoon Temash Institute for Indigenous Management et al. v. Attorney of Belize, Claim No. 394 (Supreme Court 
of Belize, Judgment of 3 April 2013), ¶ 13, available at http://www.belizejudiciary.org/web/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/Supreme-Court-Claim-No-394-of-2013-Sarstoon-Temash-Institute-for-Indigenous-
Management-et-al-v-The-Attorney-General-of-Belize-et-al-.pdf.  
45 Id. at ¶ 13. 
46 Maya Leaders Alliance et al. v. Attorney General of Belize, CCJ Appeal No BZCV2014/002  (Caribbean Court of 
Justice, Judgment of 30 October 2015), ¶¶ 9-10, available at http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/2015-CCJ-15AJ.pdf. 
47 Coc, Address at Native American Law Students Association. 
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Belize Constitution, the CCJ stressed that it was “aware of and accord[ed] great significance to 
relevant international law jurisprudence, particularly the 2004 Report of Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (the IACHR) which made findings on the application of Articles 
II and XXIII of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (the American 
Declaration) to the claim by the Maya people to protection of their customary land rights (the Maya 
Communities case).” 48  It referenced rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 2007 UNDRIP.49 In the end, it 
found that the Belize Government had violated the Maya’s constitutional rights, and ordered the 
government “to establish a fund of BZ$300,000.00 as a first step towards compliance with its 
undertaking” in its 2015 settlement with the Maya.50 International law, in other words, provided 
tools that helped shift the balance of power between the Belizean state and indigenous groups 
through its penetration into the Belizean legal system, backed by oversight by regional and 
international institutions to which Belize is accountable.  
Implementation was contested. After the CCJ’s decision, the Belizean government delayed, 
for several years, taking meaningful steps to pass legislation to effectuate the terms of the parties’ 
consent decree.51 The Belizean government continued to issue logging and oil exploration permits 
without first consulting with or receiving consent from the Maya. As a result, the Maya returned 
to the CCJ for further help in compelling the Belizean government to implement the consent decree 
and a dispute resolution framework.52 Because of the Belizean government’s foot-dragging in 
developing the legislative and administrative structure to demarcate, recognize, and protect Maya 
land rights, the Maya continue to utilize procedures before international bodies to pressure the 
Belizean government to adhere to its domestic, regional, and international legal obligations.53  In 
light of the Maya’s persistence before the CCJ and international bodies, the parties are making 
progress in realizing the terms of the consent decree and the CCJ’s decisions.54  
 
2. The Ainu in Japan. Indigenous communities have mobilized throughout the world, 
including in countries that were not subject to colonial occupation and thus did not view 
themselves as constrained by indigenous rights law. For example, the Japanese government long 
viewed itself as a homogenous society, and refused to recognize the existence of the Ainu, an 
indigenous group on the island of Hokkaido, as a minority group, much less as one protected by 
indigenous rights. Indeed, so powerful were the government’s assimilationist policies that the Ainu 
                                                                    
48 Maya Leaders Alliance et al. v. Attorney General of Belize, CCJ Appeal No BZCV2014/002, ¶ 8.  
49 Id. at ¶¶ 54, 59. 
50 Id. at ¶ 79. 
51 Belize: Hearing at International Courts Demonstrates Belize’s Noncompliance in Landmark Maya Land Rights 
Case, CULTURAL SURVIVAL, Oct. 26, 2017, https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/belize-hearing-international-
courts-demonstrates-belizes-noncompliance-landmark-maya-land. 
52 Glenn Tillett, Caribbean Court Justice “Exasperated” with GOB’s Delay in Implementing Maya Court Order, 
AMANDALA, Feb. 24, 2018, http://amandala.com.bz/news/caribbean-court-justice-exasperated-gobs-delay-
implementing-maya-court-order/; Micah Goodin, CCJ Orders Barrow Administration to Get Serious About 
Respecting Maya Rights; Micah Goodin, CCJ Orders Barrow Administration to Get Serious About Respecting Maya 
Rights, AMANDALA, Nov. 1, 2017, http://amandala.com.bz/news/ccj-orders-barrow-administration-respecting-maya-
rights/. 
53 Maya Leaders Alliance Advocates at United Nations Urging Respect for Rule of Law Belize, CULTURAL SURVIVAL, 
May 8, 2018, https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/maya-leaders-alliance-advocates-united-nations-urging-respect-
rule-law-belize.  
54  Progress in Maya Land Tenure Policy, CHANNEL 5, Mar. 15, 2019, 
http://edition.channel5belize.com/archives/182042. 
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dropped the word Ainu from their association’s name in 1961 because of the word’s derogatory 
implications at the time.55  
In 1979, the Japanese government ratified both the ICCPR and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which required the Japanese government to 
report to these treaties’ respective monitoring bodies.56 The government also served on UN human 
rights committees, which placed it under more scrutiny from international human rights groups 
and bodies.57 In 1980, when the government was required to submit its first mandatory report to 
the Human Rights Committee regarding minority rights protected under ICCPR Article 27, it 
brazenly claimed that “minorities of the kind mentioned in the Covenant do not exist in Japan.”58 
In the meantime, the Ainu had visited and formed linkages with indigenous groups in North 
America and Scandinavia. These encounters helped catalyze and invigorate a greater sense of pride 
in their indigenous identity.59 Japan’s claim prompted the Ainu to organize a response. In 1986, 
with the assistance of an international non-governmental organization, the Ainu initiated a 
procedure before the new UN Human Rights Committee to report Japan’s violations of the group’s 
rights.60 
International human rights law helped transform the Ainu movement’s sense of “actorhood” 
and empowered and opened new opportunities for it.61 In 1987, the Japanese government first 
acknowledged the Ainu as a distinct group.62 In 1992, it acknowledged that Ainu “may be called 
minorities under (Article 27)” of the ICCPR in its third report to the Human Rights Committee. In 
1997, Japan enacted an Ainu Cultural Promotion Law. 63 By 2008, the year after UNDRIP’s 
adoption, fearful of embarrassment at Japan’s Universal Periodical Review before the UN Human 
Rights Council and from potential protests at the Hokkaido G-8 Summit, the Japanese Diet passed 
a unanimous resolution that acknowledged the Ainu as an indigenous group.64 A year later, the 
Hokkaido Utari Association changed its named back to the Hokkaido Ainu Association out of a 
sense of pride and strengthened identity.65 The Ainu’s engagement, in turn, reciprocally helped 
consolidate indigenous rights norms and diffuse them for use by other indigenous groups in Asia.66 
Human rights activists and attorneys often use international institutions, such as the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Council, and the UN Human 
Rights Committee as leverage to bring countries to the table, including when they formally lose 
their human rights law claims in domestic courts. These bodies can be fruitful in affecting change 
                                                                    
55 Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights and Minority Activism in Japan: Transformation of Movement Actorhood and 
Local-Global Feedback Loop, 122:4 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 1050 (2017); KIYOTERU TSUTSUI,, RIGHTS 
MAKE MIGHT: GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MINORITY SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN JAPAN (Oxford University Press, 
2018). 
56 Tsutsui, Human Rights and Minority Activism in Japan, 1059. 
57 Id. at 1063. 
58 Id. at 1066.   
59  In his detailed empirical study, Kiyoteru Tsutsui concludes, “[i]f not for Ainu’s encounter with international 
indigenous rights activities, it is highly unlikely that movement initiation would have happened for Ainu, especially 
as an indigenous rights movement.” Tsutsui, Human Rights and Minority Activism in Japan, 1070. 
60 Id. at 1066-1067. 
61 Id. at 1066-1069. 
62 Id. at 1067. 
63 Id. at 1068. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1069.  
66 Id. at 1083. 
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and in obtaining favorable settlements for their clients.67 As these case studies illustrate, by turning 
our conceptual focus to that of transnational legal ordering and transnational legal orders, we see 
how norms penetrate and shape law, legal practice, and social identity within states. International 
law, in sum, is not simply a technology that exists to solve discrete transnational problems; it 
shapes state law, institutions, professions, and social identity. It does so dynamically and 
recursively, often in response to considerable resistance.68 
 
C. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW’S BROADER SCOPE AND DEEPER IMPACT   
  COMPARED TO JESSUP’S TIME 
 
We started with concrete examples in two discrete subject areas of the broader and deeper 
implications of public international law today for law, institutions, professions, social identity, and 
accountability within states. Quantitative data illustrates the broader implications of public 
international law across most areas of social life since Jessup’s time. International law has 
expanded far beyond inter-state relations, as then understood.69 It is now a key component in 
transnational legal ordering and the creation of transnational legal orders.  
In recent years, with the relative decline of U.S. and European economic power, the rise of 
emerging economies, and the turn to security concerns since the destruction of the World Trade 
Center in New York on September 11, 2001, some have posited a stagnation and decline of 
traditional modes of public international law. For example, in a 2014 article, Pauwelyn, Wessel, 
and Wouters argue, “formal international law is stagnating in terms both of quantity and quality.”70 
They point to the decline in the number of new multilateral treaties deposited with the UN 
                                                                    
67 James L. Cavallaro, Toward Fair Play: A Decade of Transformation and Resistance in International Human Rights 
Advocacy in Brazil, 3:2 CHINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 481, 486-487 (2002) (“After eight years of litigation 
in which the Brazilian state consistently and repeatedly missed deadlines and failed to engage the system seriously, 
the Commission prepared a final report condemning the state of Brazil for violations of the American Declaration and 
the American Convention on Human Rights. Shortly before that report was in its final phase of consideration for 
publication, the Brazilian government expressed its interest in reaching a friendly solution.”); James L. Cavallaro & 
Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the 
Inter-American Court, 102:4 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 768, 787-788; 793 (2008); James L. 
Cavallaro & Emily J. Schaffer, Less As More: Rethinking Supranational Litigation of Economic and Social Rights in 
the Americas, 56 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 217, 238-239 (2004) (“In varying degrees, states in the Americas (and in 
the rest of the world) legitimate themselves through their insertion in international organizations, structures and 
discourse. This internal legitimization process can empower actors—whether social movements, NGOs, or lawyers—
to the extent they are able to tap into the strength of international networks and intergovernmental oversight bodies . . . 
[T]he force of oversight bodies goes far beyond their legal powers, which are rarely, if ever, what matters most within 
the country whose abuses are subject to adjudication. It is the fact of international rebuke or condemnation that is of 
greatest import to those seeking to challenge state abuses within a given country.”). 
68 Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Recursivity Theory: A Review Essay of Halliday & Carruthers’ Bankrupt, 9:71 
SOCIOECONOMIC REVIEW 371 (2011); Halliday & Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, in: Halliday & 
Shaffer, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 500-503, 513-516. See infra Part E. 
69  Jessup, TRANSNATIONAL LAW, 1 (preferring the term transnational law because “the term ‘international’ is 
misleading since it suggests that one is concerned only with the relations of one nation (or state) to other nations (or 
states).”). 
70 Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters, When Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation and Dynamics 
in International Lawmaking, 25:3 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 733, 733-734 (2014). In 2014, AJIL 
Unbound likewise organized a special Agora on “The End of Treaties?.” Humberto Cantú-Rivera, The Expansion of 
International Law Beyond Treaties, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UNBOUND, May 9, 2014, available 
at https://www.asil.org/blogs/expansion-international-law-beyond-treaties-agora-end-treaties.  
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Secretary General from an average of thirty-five treaties per decade between 1950 and 2000, to 
twenty from 2000 to 2010.71 They cite to parallel decreases in bilateral treaties, which dropped 
from 12,566 in the 1990s to 9,484 in the 2000s, treaties transmitted to the U.S. Senate, and 
international agreements reported to the U.S. Congress.72 Overall, they highlight a turn toward 
informal lawmaking through non-binding soft law.  
These numbers, however, reflect neither a decline of public international law, nor in the 
ongoing role of treaties and (more broadly) other forms of international agreements. First, the 
number of new treaties is still significant. Second, the aggregate number of treaties continues to 
grow. The comparison with the number of treaties in Jessup’s time is striking. In 1959, there were 
7,779 treaties on deposit with the U.N. Secretary General, with 105 of them being multilateral 
treaties.73 As of 2014, around 56,500 treaties were on deposit with the U.N. Secretary General,74 
with over 560 being multilateral treaties.75 Third, Pauwelyn et al. did not include amendments, 
protocols, and annexes to treaties in their calculations.76  
Decline in the annual growth rate of new treaties also does not capture trends in state 
ratification of treaties across issue areas. In trade law, the original membership of General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 23 countries when it was created in 1948; by the 
end of 2018, the WTO had 164 members.77 In parallel, plurilateral and bilateral trade agreements 
proliferated. In 1956, there were only two preferential trade agreements notified to the GATT,78 
but by 2016, 419 were in force, and 625 had been notified.79 For commercial arbitration, the UN 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards had only 25 parties 
on December 31, 1958, the year it went into effect, but 153 countries are parties today. 80 
Ratification of the six core human rights treaties likewise increased significantly, rising by over 
50% from 927 ratifications in 2000 to 1,586 ratifications by 2012. That number increases by about 
another 50% to approximately 2,000 ratifications if one includes the treaties’ optional protocols.81 
Likewise, there were no bilateral investment treaties (BITs) signed at the time of Jessup’s 
lecture in 1956, as the first was signed between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan in 
                                                                    
71 Pauwelyn et al., When Structures Become Shackles, 734.  
72 Id. at 735.  
73 Adolf Sprudzs, Status of Multilateral Treaties—Researcher’s Mystery, Mess or Muddle?, 66:2 AMERICAN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 365, 365 (1962) (noting that these are just treaties on deposit at the U.N.).  
74 Introduction to Christian J. Tams, Antonios Tzanakopoulos & Andreas Zimmerman with Athene E. Richford (eds.), 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TREATIES x (Edward Elgar, 2014).  
75 Overview, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages 
/Overview.aspx?path=overview/overview/page1_en.xml (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). 
76 Pauwelyn, et al., When Structures Become Shackles, 734.  
77 Understanding the WTO: The Organization, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available at https://www.wto.org 
/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). 
78  World Trade Organization, WTO Analytical Index 88 (2012).  
79 Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available at https://www.wto.org/english 
/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).  
80 Paolo Contini, International Commercial Arbitration: The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 8:3 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 283, 291 (1959); Status of 
Treaties: Chapter XXII: Commercial Arbitration, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, available at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages 
/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-1&chapter=22&lang=en (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). 
81  Navnethem Pillay, Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System 17 (2012), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/HRTD/docs/HCReportTBStrengthening.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). 
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1959.82 Since then, the number soared to almost 2,500 by the end of 2005,83 and then rose more 
slowly (as the number of remaining pairings decreased) to 2,860 BITs by mid-2013.84 Overall, the 
international investment regime consists of more than 3,300 agreements, which includes over 
2,900 BITs and over 350 other treaties with such investment provisions. Litigation has soared 
under them: In 1987, there was no recorded litigation under bilateral investment treaties, but by 
the 2018 the number had climbed to over 900, rising rapidly.85  
Ratifications of these treaties are not about ad hoc problem solving; rather, the aim is to 
reach deep within state law, institutions, and practices. Take human rights treaties, which is the 
subject of considerable empirical research. Elkins, Ginsburg and Simmons show their impact on 
national constitutions. After the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
and the ICCPR, the number of rights found in national constitutions almost doubled. 86  The 
inclusion of a right in the UDHR correlates with its inclusion in a national constitution by as much 
as fifty percent.87 After a country ratified the ICCPR, the similarity of the rights included in the 
constitution to those in the ICCPR increased by almost ten points, controlling for other factors.88 
In terms of state practice, Simmons shows that for states in a period of democratic transition, 
human rights treaties have significant effects by shaping executive agendas, supporting activist 
groups litigating before domestic courts, and mobilizing domestic support. 89  As regards the 
European Convention of Human Rights, Madsen shows its significant impacts within Europe.90 
Litigation before the European Court of Human Rights, for example, transformed the unwritten 
constitution of United Kingdom (U.K.). 91  The U.K. “domesticated” treaty responsibility by 
                                                                    
82  UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1995-2006: TRENDS IN INVESTMENT RULEMAKING, (2007), 1, 
available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf. During this time, there were some commercial treaties, such 
as the U.S. signature of treaties of friendship, navigation and commerce, but they were not of the same nature in terms 
of the depth and breadth of commitments, and in terms of giving rights to private investors to directly bring claims 
against host states.  
83 Id. 
84 UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICYMAKING IN TRANSITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
OF TREATY RENEWAL, available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary 
/webdiaepcb2013d9_en.pdf. 
85 Since many cases are kept confidential, the number is higher in reality. For statistics, see UNCTAD, Investment 
Policy Hub, at https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS?status=1000.  
86  Zachery Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & Beth Simmons, Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional 
Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54:1 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 63, 76-80 (2013) (while 
“nine constitutions written in 1947 contain an average of 17.6 rights, . . . the six written in 1949 contain an average of 
31 rights”). 
87 Id. at 80. 
88 Id. at 87-88 (such as “controlling for the era and a country’s prior constitutional tradition vis-a`-vis the ICCPR”).  
89  BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 112-155 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009); Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal 
Scholarship, 106 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 22-25 (2012). 
90 Mikael Madsen, The Challenging Authority of the European Court of Human Rights: From Cold War Legal 
Diplomacy to the Brighton Declaration and Backlash, 79 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 141, 166-167 (2016) 
(“Institutionally, the ECtHR became a de facto constitutional court for most member states because the Convention—
although in most dualist countries only having the status of statutory law—effectively governed human rights at a 
transnational constitutional level.”). 
91 Alec Stone Sweet, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe, 1:1 
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 53, 71-72 (2012) (“Under the UK Human Rights Act (2000), individuals may challenge 
all acts, including Parliamentary legislation; if a Parliamentary statute is found to be incompatible with the ECHR, the 
high courts are obligated to issue a ruling of incompatibility – but they may not set aside the offending legislative 
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shifting authority for it from the Foreign Office to the Home Office. The treaty also catalyzed the 
development of a new profession in the U.K., that of “specialized human rights lawyers,” which 
since spread to other European states.92  
Environmental law shows similar trends. The modern period of major international 
environmental agreements began in 1972 with the Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment.93 Since then, the growth of international environmental law instruments increased 
steadily, with the number of multilateral environmental agreements more than doubling over the 
twenty years leading up to the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro.94 As of July 2013, the International Environmental Agreements Database Project reports 
over 1,190 multilateral environmental agreements, 1,550 bilateral environmental agreements, and 
250 other environmental agreements on deposit at the UN, 95 including nine new multilateral 
environmental agreements since 2012.96 In contrast, no multilateral environmental agreements 
were in force at the time of Jessup’s lectures.97 
In addition, a decrease in the rate of new treaties does not indicate a decline in treaties’ role. 
The number of new amendments to the U.S. Constitution is non-existent, yet no one would suggest 
the end of U.S. constitutional law. Analogously, international courts and analogous bodies have 
proliferated, and they interpret and apply treaties to new contexts. According to Alter, if we 
exclude the GATT’s non-compulsory dispute system, only two operative permanent international 
courts existed in 1956 — the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ).98  By 1956, these two courts together had issued only twenty-two binding judgments.99  In 
1989, at the tail end of the Cold War, the number of permanent international courts increased to 
six.100 Alter reports that by 2013 there were at least twenty-four permanent international courts 
that collectively issued 37,000 binding legal judgment. 101  And over one hundred other 
international bodies interpret international rules, complementing these courts. 102  In sum, 
                                                                    
provisions. Declarations of incompatibility are addressed to the Parliament, which must indicate what remedial 
legislation, if any, will be proposed.”).  
92 Madsen, The Challenging Authority of the European Court of Human Rights, 157.  
93 Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey, International Environmental Law: Mapping the Field, in: Daniel 
Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey (eds.), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
(Oxford University Press, 2007), 1, 3. 
94 Peter H. Sand, Evolution of International Environmental Law, in: Bodansky, Brunnée & Hey, THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 29, 35.  
95 Data from Ronald B. Mitchell. 2002-2016, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (IEA) DATABASE 
PROJECTS, available at http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?file=home.htm&query=static (last visited Apr. 2, 2019) (Note 
that they started recording MEAs from 1950). 
96 Id.  
97  Relationship between WTO and MEA Rules, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_mea_e.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). 
98 Karen J. Alter, The Evolving International Judiciary, 7 ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 387, 388 
(2011); 
E-mail from Karen J. Alter, Professor, Department of Policy Science, Northwestern University, to Gregory Shaffer, 
Chancellor’s Professor of Law, UC Irvine School of Law (Aug. 18, 2016) (on file with author). 
99 Id. The ICJ issued ten and the ECJ issued twelve.  Even if we include the GATT’s sixteen decisions by 1956, these 
three adjudicatory bodies collectively only issued thirty-eight binding judgment by the time of Jessup’s lectures. 
100 Alter, The Evolving International Judiciary, 388. 
101 KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS (Princeton University 
Press, 2014), 4. 
102 Alter, The Evolving International Judiciary, 388. 
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amendments, protocols, and annexes, coupled with treaty interpretation and application, show that 
international treaties continue to be used to respond to an expanding scope of contexts. 
The work of Pauwelyn and others, moreover, posits not a move away from international 
public lawmaking, but rather a move to soft law and informal means of advancing transnational 
legal ordering. The institutional architecture for international lawmaking has broadened and 
deepened, giving rise to secondary lawmaking, and in particular involving soft law and informal 
modes of reporting and peer review to oversee implementation of these norms. 103  These 
developments have enhanced the scope and depth of international law across almost all areas of 
social life. In 1956, the year of Jessup’s lectures, the UIA Yearbook of International Organizations 
reported there were 132 intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and 985 international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs).104 By 2018, the numbers skyrocketed to at least 7,726 IGOs 
and 62,621 INGOs.105 Even more importantly, early IGOs were much more constrained in their 
power and area of coverage.106 IGOs now play a much more significant role in establishing norms, 
procedures, peer review mechanisms, dispute settlement, and other forms of intergovernmental 
interaction, coordinating resources and expertise.107  
The development of international institutions has empowered INGOs, who are their 
frequent interlocutors and partners. Intergovernmental organizations grant INGOs “observer or 
consultative status, access to documents, and even on occasion, other forms of institutional voice 
such as the power to distribute compromise legal texts during a treaty negotiation or to file amicus 
briefs in institutionalized dispute settlement forums.” 108  INGOs, in turn, reciprocally help 
intergovernmental organizations by diffusing international hard and soft law norms through INGO 
networks within states, helping bring the norms home. They serve as intermediary norm conveyors. 
These international organizations have been active in creating soft law, which aims to 
shape national law and practice. Such soft law affects governance of areas traditionally seen as 
strictly domestic, such as “financial regulation, consumer protection, and law enforcement.”109 
Accurately measuring the amount of soft law is impossible, but there is general consensus that it 
has been on the rise for some time, with some arguing that it has become more important than hard 
                                                                    
103 Gregory Shaffer & Mark Pollack, Hard and Soft Law: What have We Learned?, in: Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. 
Pollack (eds.), INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: INSIGHTS FROM INTERDISCIPLINARY 
SCHOLARSHIP (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
104 UIA Yearbook of International Organizations 2015-2016, UNION OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, available at 
http://www.uia.org/allpubs?combine=&field_pub_year_value=&items_per_page=20&page=8&order=field_uia_pub
lication_nr_&sort=asc (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). 
105 UIA Yearbook of International Organizations 2018-2019, UNION OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, available at 
https://uia.org/sites/uia.org/files/misc_pdfs/pubs/yb_2018_vol2_lookinside.pdf 
 (last visited Apr. 2, 2019) (reports data collected in 2017). The UIA Yearbook defines an intergovernmental 
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and Environment, 8:37 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY RESEARCH 333, 334 (2015) (as an example of an early 
IGO, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine established in 1815). 
107 JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS (Oxford University Press, 2005), 589-619. 
108  Jose E. Alvarez, Governing the World: International Organizations as Lawmakers, 31:3 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 591, 597 (2008). 
109 Jean Galbraith & David T. Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 735, 747 (2014). 
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law. 110  The proliferation of transnational legal orders comes not just from formal public 
international (hard) law, but arguably even more from the explosion of soft law and the increased 
scope that soft law instruments and mechanisms provide for creating, expanding, and deepening 
transnational legal orders. 
To view how a soft law process works, take the example of bankruptcy law. The UN 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has created principles and model codes 
for bankruptcy law for all U.N. members. Those who participate most actively in the UNCITRAL 
process are only a handful of members, such as the U.S. and European Union (E.U.), 
complemented by professional associations, such as INSOL International (a global federation of 
national associations of insolvency accountants and lawyers) and specialized sections of the 
International Bar Association and the American Bar Association.111 These actors help define the 
problems that need to be addressed, and set the legal norms to resolve them. Some of the problems 
are of a “transnational nature,” as contemplated by Jessup, in that some bankruptcies are multi-
jurisdictional. Some of the impetus is also “transnational” because of broader concerns regarding 
economic spillovers if financial crises are not contained through improved national bankruptcy 
law. In all cases, however, the intended impact is much deeper than resolving discrete transnational 
problems, as with private law. Rather, the impact is to reach deep within the institutional 
architecture of the state, affecting the power of different state institutions, including executives, 
legislatures, courts, independent agencies, and professions regarding corporate bankruptcy law.112  
 
D. THE INTERACTION OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH PRIVATE 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER RULES IN TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
 ORDERING 
 
The concepts of transnational legal ordering and transnational legal orders do not examine public 
international law in isolation from Jessup’s other two components of transnational law: private 
international law and “other rules.” Public international law interacts with them as part of broader 
processes of transnational legal ordering, giving rise to the settlement and unsettlement of legal 
norms in transnational legal orders defined by functional as opposed to territorial logics.113 These 
transnational legal orders may be constituted by a mix of public international law, private 
international law, and private ordering. Some transnational legal orders rest on configurations that 
rely more on public international law and others less so. Empirical research is needed to assess 
variations and their relative importance for the institutionalization of legal norms in response to 
different types of social problems. 
At times, public international law and institutions operate as orchestrators by delegating 
authority to and monitoring private legal ordering initiatives. Abbott, Snidal, and their 
collaborators trace such orchestration processes in the fields of international health, environmental, 
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International Governance, AMERICAN JOURNAL INTERNATIONAL LAW UNBOUND, Apr. 28, 2014, available at 
https://www.asil.org/blogs/collective-decision-making-international-governance-agora-end-treaties. 
111 Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm-Making and National Law-
making in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 1135 (2007). 
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finance, telecommunications, and labor law. 114 Reciprocally, private actors orchestrate public 
international law and institutions, as exemplified by the role of private actors behind the adoption 
of the TRIPS Agreement,115 in drafting legal texts such as for bankruptcy law,116 and in driving 
interpretation through directly bringing claims, such as under indigenous rights law and 
investment-state dispute settlement, or doing the legal work for states to bring claims such as in 
trade law.117 Public and private actors endorse and borrow from each other’s texts to advance their 
goals. The WTO agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, for example, incorporates the 
standards of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO); international investment 
tribunals reference the International Bar Association’s guidelines for conflicts of interest and rules 
for taking evidence;118 and the International Tropical Timber Organization has endorsed the Forest 
Stewardship Council’s standards.119 Reciprocally, GLOBALG.A.P, a private organization that 
certifies agricultural products, incorporates the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points 
(HACCP) guidelines published by the UN Food and Agricultural (FAO).120 
Public international law also interacts with private international law. It authorizes the 
privatization of dispute settlement through arbitration that displaces national courts. The 1958 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards recognizes, facilitates, and 
legitimizes these privatized processes.121 International treaties also govern some choice of law 
norms, whether regionally (in Europe and to a lesser extent Latin America) or functionally (in 
family law, with some developments in commercial law).122 Public international law, private 
international law, and private legal ordering are not simply alternative forms of transnational legal 
ordering. They shape, complement, and support each other. 
 
E. RESISTANCE: THE RISE AND FALL OF TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING 
  
Transnational legal orders are not inexorable. They settle and unsettle; they rise and fall. 
They often, if not typically, encounter strong resistance. 123 Such resistance arises because of 
transnational legal ordering’s deep implications within states, especially when involving public 
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law. Those marginalized from centers of power resist, as do powerful countries when they feel 
constrained. Resistance can come from any direction, locally, nationally, and transnationally, 
including through the engagement of other international organizations. Local actors may develop 
legal doctrines or extra-legal strategies to foil transnational powers.124 Non-governmental groups 
may work to develop counter-norms at the international level, as done in the struggle to ensure 
access to medicines to thwart internationally required patent protection through pressing for 
responses from the World Health Organization and United Nations human rights committees.125  
Contests arise because of a transnational legal order’s successes. Its institutionalization 
raises awareness that the stakes are high. The increased scope of public international law and its 
penetration into domestic legal systems can catalyze populist, nationalist responses, as illustrated 
in the United States and Europe, punctuated by the election of President Donald Trump in the 
United States, the vote in the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, and the rise of 
nationalist/populist parties and leaders in a number of E.U. countries, such as Hungary and 
Poland.126 Ironically, the United States and Europe were the architects of much of the transnational 
legal ordering that has catalyzed such popular resistance.  
Within national legal systems, legislatures and courts have raised screens to the legal 
effects of public international law. Verdier and Versteeg code domestic legal system’s reception 
of international law, and find “that while domestic rules generally give the national executive the 
leading role in negotiating and concluding treaties, this power is increasingly constrained by 
legislative approval requirements, constitutional review of treaties, and other procedures that 
allocate authority—and sometimes veto power—to legislatures, courts and other domestic 
actors.”127 In the United States, the Supreme Court has created a presumption that international 
treaties do not create rights of action before domestic courts, and tightened doctrine regarding the 
direct effect of treaties in U.S. law without Congressional implementation.128 The Court has 
signaled that constitutional allocations of power to sub-federal states could also limit U.S. domestic 
application of treaties,129 and appellate court judges have signaled a narrowing of existing doctrine 
                                                                    
124 Ibid.  
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that takes account of treaties in interpreting domestic statutes.130 Within Europe, national Supreme 
Courts have become more resistant to accepting judgments of the European Court of Justice and 
the European Court of Human Rights.131 In December 2016, for example, the Danish Supreme 
Court frontally defied the ECJ by refusing to apply the ECJ’s judgment in the AJOS case 
(concerning the application of an EU directive on age discrimination) in light of existing Danish 
law.132 
Nonetheless, where policymakers and stakeholders continue to view problems in 
transnational terms, they often turn to law to address them. Given public international law’s deep 
implications within states, there may be a turn to less formal, stealthier means of transnational 
legal ordering, including greater relative use of soft law, private international law, and private legal 
ordering to address transnational problems. The secular trend, we contend, will involve more than 
ad hoc problem solving, and will continue to entail deeper processes of legal ordering that 




Public international law remains central to the concept of transnational law, both 
empirically and normatively. It is even more central than when Jessup wrote his seminal lectures 
and included public international law within his broader concept. Public international law is a 
critical part of the concept today because of its deep implications for transnational legal ordering 
and the creation of transnational legal orders. Empirically, international law has critical 
implications for the role of markets (and thus what the state does), the allocation of power among 
state institutions, the creation and role of professions, and the development of transnational 
accountability mechanisms operating under particular normative frameworks.  
This chapter stresses the bottom-up, top-down, and recursive nature of transnational legal 
processes that give rise to transnational legal orders. It shows how the development of public 
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international law is a place where domestic problems and domestic struggles—whether over 
human rights, commercial law, or regulatory reform—get played out in international arenas 
alongside domestic ones. States and private actors seek to “upload” domestic legal norms to 
advance policies as well as to “download” and institutionalize them within and across domestic 
jurisdictions. These processes are dynamic and recursive.  
Public international law should not be viewed in isolation of private international law, 
national law, and private legal ordering. Rather, much of public international law consists of the 
uploading and export of national and privately developed legal norms, whether from powerful 
states, professions, or other private actors. The resulting public international law norms interact 
with private legal ordering and private international law, from arbitration to private standard 
setting, from trade to human rights. Together, they give rise to transnational legal orders governing 
different legal domains.  
Normatively, the problems (and thus the issues at stake) are socially and politically 
constructed, involving contests among actors. Public international law, as law more generally, 
tends to have a slant in favor of the privileged. It accordingly must be subject to empirically 
grounded, normative critique. At the same time, law is needed for ordering and the institutional 
alternatives for ordering involve tradeoffs. Law constrains power as well as reflects power, and 
power is needed to accomplish social ends. It is important to retain a public law element to 
transnational legal ordering because otherwise, the concept of transnational law, as conceived by 
Jessup, risks becoming disconnected from the public sphere. Public international law and 
institutions are needed to address transnational problems, in complement with private international 
law and private norm making. A critical role for transnational scholars is both to reveal the place 
and roles of international law and institutions while critiquing their processes. An essential way of 
proceeding is to evaluate transnational legal ordering through which legal norms are constructed, 
conveyed, resisted, implemented, and have effects. Only then might we participate effectively in 
improving the way things are.  
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